Thoughts: The Ebb and Flow

What does love entail?  Well, love seems to be that which entails action, rather than merely being a feeling of an individual.  Love as a feeling is subjective and may or may not necessitate action, but love as a virtue is different.  When passing by someone in need on the streets, love would require that this person is not just considered, but acted upon out of love.  Love as a virtue requires acts of love.  This is what makes love so vastly demanding.

In order for love to function as a virtue, however, it must have limitations.  Is it an act of love if I give 5 dollars to a beggar on the street, or is it better for me to donate that money to an organization that provides job opportunities for the homeless?  There is some required discernment.  Thus, it seems that love cannot be universally acted upon, but must be considered and given its due regarding individual constraints.  

In an affluent society, as affluents individuals, the demands of love is greater than for those who have little disposable income.  Because love and acts of love are considered practically but established theoretically, the closer to the theoretical that is possible is better and in fact obligatory.  If one is able to give away a great amount of personal resources, this seems to be a requirement of love.  Therefore, if one is able to take care of the needs of near neighbors, it is also required of that individual to take care of distant neighbors as well.

Even when dealing with limited resources, although priority should be given to those nearest to me, I still have an obligation of love towards those distant from me, even if this obligation is not as strong as my obligation towards those nearest to me.  For example, if I must immediately choose to either save a drowning child in a pond I am passing by or instead make a phone call to donate money to save the life of a starving African child, it seems my obligation is to the drowning child.  However, there is nothing preventing me, resource-wise or time-wise, from calling immediately after in order to donate money.

Perhaps there is a distinction with how we can give acts of love for near and distant neighbors.  In deed, because we can more effectively recognize the needs of our near neighbors, perhaps it is our time and energy that ought to be given in acts of love to those nearest to us, whereas our money ought to be more equally distributed between those near us and distant from us.

What would this look like?  I guess, this could be seen in how we give of ourselves.  For example, when we give our time to those around us, we are acting out of love to those near us.  Perhaps this, then, indicates the inherent preference for those near us.  However, when dealing with money, we can use our resources to benefit near and distant neighbors equally, or near equally.  Our resources could in fact be better used in a way that confronts the greatest current need.  Instead of focusing on those near us, money could be lovingly given to distant neighbors who are facing impending situations that threaten their survival.

One example:  A lawyer, who works 60-80 hours a week, ends up working anywhere from 3500-5000 hours a year.  However, in order to fulfill obligations of love, the lawyer is able to donate 100 hours of her time to pro bono causes such as defending those who can’t afford a lawyer.  This would be her fulfillment of love towards near neighbors.  However, this lawyer could also donate several thousand dollars of her yearly income to charities that alleviate global hunger and extreme poverty for people abroad.  In this way, she is able to meet needs of both near and distant neighbors, while still designating a specific preference for those near her by providing them with what could be considered a more significant contribution of services.

This is rough, but nonetheless a theory I am working out in my most recent ethics paper.

Just had a lecture on Kant, specifically dealing with his Formula of Universal Law (FUL).

Now, in the philosophy faculty library working on my essay on Kant’s concept of the “good will.”

What do I think of Kant?

His concept of universalizability of moral actions is indeed very appealing, yet I believe there are some problems with it.  Must every action be universalizable?  Are all actions even moral actions?  For instance, if I decide to take a break from writing my paper, is that a moral action?  I don’t think so.  But this is more of an addendum to Kant rather than a refutation.

Next week, the lecture I am attending will be talking about the Formula for Humanity, which is Kant’s assertion that we should treat every human being as an end, rather than merely as a means.  This, I believe, is a much stronger basis for a moral code.  If we treat others as an end, we will inherently seem to abide by the proscriptive duties of the categorical imperative, and yet at the same time avoid the problems with it, such as the Problem of Beneficence (which maybe ought to be delved into in another post.)

I am currently writing my essay on whether the good will is the only thing that is good without qualification.  Essentially, Kant posits that nothing else is good without qualification.  Virtues such as courage, magnificence, and others are only good when tied to a good will, for otherwise they could be corrupted and turned into morally wrong characteristics.  Also, material happiness is not good without qualification, for wealth and abundant health, among other things, can lead to a sense of selfishness or other wrong moral habits.  Therefore, it is only the good will that is truly good.

While Kant makes some interesting points, I do not believe that he is right to assert that the virtues are “corruptible.”  There seem to be problems with reducing morality to the good will, for there are some virtues, such as honesty or prudence, that even when taken in conjunction with a “bad will,” will not become corrupted without changing from the virtue.  For example, let us say that person A is involved in a transaction with person B.  Person A operates from a virtuous position of honesty, making sure every act she does is honest, among other virtues, if she has a good will.  If she has a bad will, she will merely consider the best outcomes for herself.  However, it is preposterous to say that A was operating from honesty when she had a bad will in the first place.  Perhaps virtue is also good without qualification, and virtuous action is indicative of a “good will,” or as Aristotle would say, “a soul functioning in accordance with virtue.” 

Kant obsessively pursues some first principle of morality, and moves ethical considerations from discussions on how to live the good life, to some sort of salvatory principle governing human life.  I think that this shift is erroneous, and that virtue ought to be a fundamental ground upon which morality should be based.

Within the work I have read of Kant, he asserts a very innovative and appealing moral foundation, yet I am not satisfied.  I am currently reading through Alastair McIntyre’s “After Virtue,” and I think that the moral concepts of virtue ethics within this book, and from what I have found in my studies of Aristotle, best govern my ethical enquiries.

I read Plato’s Euthyphro earlier today and I can’t get the ideas out of my mind… “is something pious because it is loved by the gods, or is something loved by the gods because it is pious?”

Taking this question that was asked by Socrates and applying it to a modern theistic understanding of God is not too troublesome, because he later qualifies that he is talking about “what is loved by all the gods is pious, and what is hated by all the gods impious” thus making all of the gods (pantheism) into single-mindedness (theistic implications).

So I thought about it, and I agree with Socrates.  Something is loved and deemed moral by God because it is pious. 

(But Ryan, this removes the moral from God! You can’t accept that!)

Actually, I can.  And I almost have to.  Saying that what is pious is so because it is loved by God removes all moral distinctions.  For whatever God proclaims “pious” is pious, regardless of whether it is right or not.  Thus, we essentially become theistic nihilists, not believing in any true moral standard other than what God commands.

(But Ryan, this isn’t nihilistic, because obviously God is a loving God and He is the definition of what is good!)

Let’s deconstruct that.  First, if you accept that what is pious is so because it is loved by God, than saying that God is a loving God makes no sense.  How can He be “loving” when the quality of “love” is in no way outside of Him? Thus saying that God is loving is saying nonsense.  It is like me saying, “I am me.”

If God is the definition of what is good, we are right back where we started, with a nihilistic dilemma. What do we do?

Well, I can follow Kierkegaard and say that my relationship with God inextricably leads me to moral belief, and not just that, but a “teleological suspension of the ethical.”  Thus, you reject ethical boundaries found in the world, or even in Scripture, to follow the direct command of God a la Abraham sacrificing Isaac.

Another option is to trust in the goodness of God, regardless of the moral and logical dilemmas this causes.  I, personally, am not willing to suspend thought, logic, and my intuitive sense of justice to simply accept what I am told.

So I am going to take the option that delineates an ethic that is beyond God, that God adheres to.  This makes my God neither omnipotent, nor omniscient in some ways, but it makes Him both logically and morally consistent.

Final Objection: (But Ryan, God’s ways are so far above our ways, who are we to question His actions?)

I do not accept skepticism as an answer, only as a cop out.  If we are made in the image of God and given the ability to know God, then we can indeed know what He is like.  If there is no way to know Him, we are stuck with an agnostic reality that few Bible-believing Christians are willing to accept (although I could be convinced, towards a deist position).

Sorry for such a long post, but these thoughts will help form my paper on Euthyphro, and any criticism/commentary on these thoughts is more than welcome!

Today in philosophy we started to get into Kant’s morality, but our professor started the class by talking about determinism and whether morality is possible in a society that believes everyone is scientifically determined.

Is it possible to be moral when you have no freedom to choose other than what you are determined?

One of the examples we talked about is whether child molesters can be punished if that is just the way they have been born. If behavior is dependent upon genetics and environment, that can’t be changed. And someone can’t be held accountable for a behavior they can’t control. Right?

Than again, can we succumb to the idea that some behaviors are more harmful than others to society and thus they should be punished, whether they are determined to or not. For example, a child molester would be punished for his behavior because it is harmful to children, but a nonviolent neo-Nazi could spew his hatred as long as he did not act upon it.  But then how is a behavior that is active judged over a behavior that is passive? Isn’t that a morality judgment?

Where do we even get the idea that some ideas are worse than others?

I want to hear some thoughts on this. (reblog or answer)

Is morality possible in a determined world? ARE we determined? And where does this moral sense come from?